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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
If the Batts decision holds that a cul-de-sac serving only four
families is not a road for a public use, it would seem the State
Highway Commission may encounter problems of using public
funds to maintain other dead-end roads on the Secondary Road
System that serve only a limited number of families. Any taxpayer
would have standing to bring suit to prevent misuse of agency
[State Highway Commission] powerY7 The court said: "To sus-
tain the proposed condemnation . . . under the facts and circum-
stances here would set a dangerous precedent for the expenditure
of public funds by the State Highway Commission .. .*"I How-
ever, there was not an expenditure of public funds under the facts
and circumstances here because the landlocked parties had given
the Highway Commission an indemnity bond to cover any damages
to the defendants' property. The only expenditure of funds would
be for the construction and maintenance of the road, not acquiring
the right of way.
Also in the light of the Batts decision, it seems that the State
Highway Commission will have to alter its administrative policy
of adding roads and streets to the Secondary Road System which
is maintained by the Commission. At the present time the Commis-
sion policy requirements are: "(2) Roads less than one mile in
length must have at least four occupied residences fronting the
road.... (4) There must be at least two individual property own-
ers on 'the road."29 The proposed road in Batts met both these
requirements.
HAROLD D. COLSTON
Evidence-Admissibility of Agent's Declaration Against His
Principal
The plaintiff's decedent in Branch v. Dempsey' was fatally in-
jured in a head-on collision with the defendant owner's truck being
operated by the defendant driver in the scope of his employment.2
", Stratford v. City of Greensboro, 124 N.C. 127, 32 S.E. 394 (1899).
28 265 N.C. at 360, 144 S.E.2d at 137.2 9N.C. STATE HIGHWAY COMM'N, SECONDARY ROADs 14.
'265 N.C. 733, 145 S.E.2d 395 (1965).
2The agency relationship between the owner and his driver was pre-
sumptively established by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1(b) (Supp 1965), which
provides:
Proof of the registration of a motor vehicle in the name of any
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Somethne after the wreck, the driver told an investigating officer
that the truck stalled while he was attempting to make a left turn.'
When the plaintiff offered this officer's testimony on the issue of
the driver's negligence against both defendants, the trial judge in-
structed the jury that the declaration by the defendant driver was
to be considered only against him and not against the owner, and
at the close of the plaintiff's case, he entered a nonsuit in favor of
the owner.' The North Carolina Supreme Court in a four-to-three
decision5 affirmed.' The court held that the officer's testimony was
hearsay and inadmissible against the owner since the driver had no
authority to speak on his behalf.7 It further held that the defendant
owner could not be adjudged liable for the negligent acts of his
driver committed within the scope of his employment since the only
evidence of his driver's negligence was incompetent against him.8
The majority and dissenting opinions in this case enunciate almost
all the theories advanced with respect to the admissibility of a
driver's extrajudicial declaration against his principal and the neces-
sity for such admission where it is the only evidence offered on the
issue of a driver's negligence to establish his principal's liability.
It is a well established rule that where an agent has authority
to speak for his principal, his extrajudicial declarations are treated
"as if" made by the principal and admissible against the principal
under the admission of a party opponent exception to the hearsay
rule.9 The rationale is not based on any rule of evidence but is
person, firm, or corporation, shall for the purpose of any action be
prima facie evidence of ownership and that such motor vehicle was
then being operated by and under the control of a person for whose
conduct the owner was legally responsible, for the owner's benefit,
and within the course and scope of his employment.
'The investigating officer talked with the driver at the hospital where
the plaintiff's decedent was taken after the accident and later at the police
station. He testified to the driver's declaration but failed to state in which
of these conversations the statement was made. 265 N.C. at 738, 145 S.E.2d
at 399.
' Id. at 739, 145 S.E.2d at 400.
'Justice Parker, joined by Chief Justice Denny, dissented. Id. at 749,
145 S.E.2d at 406. Justice Sharp also dissented. Id. at 756, 145 S.E.2d at
411.
8 Id. at 746, 145 S.E.2d at 404.
" Ibid. The court reasoned that the North Carolina statute creating a
prima facie agency relationship between the registered owner of a motor
vehicle and the driver applies only when the vehicle is in operation and
not to what the driver says afterwards merely narrative of a past occurrence.
8Ibid.
* STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 168 (1963).
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founded upon the substantive responsibility of the principal for the
acts of his agent committed within the scope of his authority.10 In
the situation where a driver makes a statement, the North Carolina"
and majority rule 2 is that the principal is not chargeable with the
declaration in the absence of proof that his driver had authority to
speak. Thus, a driver's statement to an investigating officer of how
the accident occurred is inadmissible against his principal. In
Branch, Justice Sharp dissented' and argued that every owner is
charged with contemplating the possibility of his driver's having an
accident; consequently, public policy demands that he extend his
driver's authority to include a narrative statement to an investigat-
ing officer. 14
It appears that the North Carolina Supreme Court could have
admitted such extrajudicial declaration against the principal on the
basis of other existing decisions. Under the res gestae exception
to the hearsay rule, 5 an agent's declaration is admissible against
his principal when made contemporaneously with the event com-
plained of or before any time has elapsed for reflection or fabrica-
tion that eliminates the "safeguard of trustworthiness."' 6 The
rationale for this exception is the inherent trustworthiness of the
declarant's statement, i.e., the circumstances under which it was
uttered makes it extremely unlikely that such declaration was fabri-
cated.' 7 Since it is just as unlikely under the circumstances that a
"04 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1078 (3d ed. 1940).
" E.g., Hobbs v. Queen City Coach Co., 225 N.C. 323, 34 S.E.2d 211
(1945) (bus driver's admission of conduct). STANSBURY, op. cit. supra
note 9, § 169.
128 Am. JuR. 2D Automobiles § 968 (1963). See McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE
§ 244 (1954); 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 10, § 1078.
1 3265 N.C. at 756, 145 S.E.2d at 411.
2, Id. at 765, 145 S.E.2d at 417. In Martin v. Savage Truck Line, 121
F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954), the court said:
To say, in these circumstances, that the owner of a motor truck may
constitute a person his agent for the purpose of the operation of
such truck over public streets and highways, and to say at the same
time that such operator is no longer the agent of such owner when
an accident occurs, for the purpose of truthfully relating the facts
concerning the occurrence to an investigating police officer on the
scene shortly thereafter, seems to me to erect an untenable fiction,
neither contemplated by the parties nor sanctioned by public policy.
Id. at 419. For other cases in accord, see Branch v. Dempsey, 265 N.C.
733, 756, 145 S.E.2d 395, 411 (1965) (Sharp, J., dissenting).





driver would fabricate a responsive statement to an investigating
officer that could subject him to civil liabilities and possible criminal
penalties and additionally might cause him to lose his job, a driver's
post rem admission of allegedly negligent conduct should be ac-
cepted as equally trustworthy.'" Thus, the court could admit such
declaration against the principal by logically extending the res gestae
exception as some courts have done' 9 or possibly by invoking
another limited exception to the hearsay rule.
In addition to the possible approach above, the court appears to
have recognized an exception to the rule excluding an agent's post
rem declaration. The plaintiff in Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co.2"
was injured when the driver of the car in which he was riding lost
control because of defective brakes. In a suit against the defendant
car dealer who had recently sold this car to the driver, the plaintiff
offered in evidence an unauthorized statement made by the defen-
dant's foreman that he knew the brakes on this type of car were
defective but had not changed them before the sale."' The court
held the agent's statement admissible against the principal for the
limited purpose of imputing knowledge of the defective brakes to
him.22 In contrast to the situation where a driver admits his con-
duct in allegedly causing a wreck, Justice Sharp argued that this
distinction seemed illogical since, in both situations, the plaintiff is
attempting to establish the principal's liability by such evidence.23
Furthermore, in Jones the risk of the declaration being untrust-
worthy was far greater than in Branch since the declarant-foreman
was not an active tort-feasor.24 This distinction creates the addi-
tional problem of defining what is admissible for this limited pur-
pose. For example, if in Branch the driver had also told the in-
vestigating officer that the truck had stalled on several occasions,
would this have been admissible under the knowledge exception? It
"' Justice Sharp made this statement of trustworthiness as a general argu-
ment for admitting an agent's declaration "as if" made by his principal.
265 N.C. at 764-65, 145 S.E.2d at 417.
" E.g., Lucchesi v. Reynolds, 125 Wash. 352, 216 Pac. 12 (1923), where
the court said, "[T]o argue from one case to another on this question of
'time to devise or contrive' is to trifle with principle and to cumber the
records with unnecessary and unprofitable quibbles." Id. at 355, 216 Pac.
at 13.
20 217 N.C. 693, 9 S.E.2d 395 (1940).
" Id. at 695, 9 S.E.2d at 396.
22 Ibid.
2, 265 N.C. at 765, 145 S.E.2d at 417.
2' Ibid.
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would seem that the court could extend this post rem exception
to include a driver's post rem admission of conduct.
Apart from these alternatives for admitting a driver's extra-
judicial declaration against his principal, the ultimate question
arises: Is it necessary that evidence of an agent's negligence be
admissible against his principal to impose liability upon him under
respondeat superior? It is a well established rule of law that a
principal is substantively responsible for the acts of his agent com-
mitted within the scope of his employment.2" As Justice Parker
argued in his dissenting opinion,26 once the jury finds the tort-
feasor's liability upon evidence competent against him and the agency
relationship is established for that tortious act, the agent's liability
is imputed to the principal by operation of law since "to hold other-
wise would be to make a mockery of the law. . ,,." This approach
is substantively correct, but it creates a dilemma where the principal
is sued separately and the only evidence of his agent's negligence
is incompetent against him. Had the plaintiff in Branch sued the
owner without joining the driver as co-defendant, he could not have
introduced the driver's admission of allegedly negligent conduct
since the driver was not a party to the action.28 Thus, recognizing
that joinder was only a matter of convenience, a majority of the
court refused to apply respondeat superior in the Branch situation.29
Even though its rationale is plausible, the court enunciated a rule
that undermines the entire concept of a principal's substantive re-
sponsibility for the negligent acts of his agent, since it is now possi-
ble for a principal to escape liability even though his agent has
admitted and been held liable for his alleged negligent conduct.
Where there is other evidence of an agent's negligence in addi-
tion to his admission so that his principal cannot obtain a nonsuit,
a problem arises as to the effectiveness of a trial judge's instruction
to the jury on the issue of their respective liability. The judge will
have to charge the jury that they must not consider the agent's ad-
mission in deciding the principal's liability so that they must find
for the principal if the other evidence of the agent's negligence is
insufficient in their minds to establish the agent's negligence. It
" 35 Am. JUR. Master and Servant § 543 (1941).
2° 265 N.C. at 749, 145 S.E.2d at 406.
-" Id. at 751, 145 S.E.2d at 407, where justice Parker was quoting from
Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 68 (10th Cir. 1958).
28 265 N.C. at 741-42, 145 S.E.2d at 401.
20 Ibid.
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is unrealistic to say that a jury will not give added weight to this
other evidence of an agent's negligence in view of his admission.
Thus, the practical effect of rendering an agent's statement inad-
missible against his principal is insignificant where there is enough
other evidence of negligence to get the issue of his principal's liabili-
ty before the jury.
From an insurance standpoint, it may be immaterial in certain
instances whether a principal is granted a nonsuit. In the Branch
type situation involving motor vehicles, the ultimate result might
well be the same as if the owner had been adjudged liable unless
the verdict exceeds the policy's coverage, since the owner's motor
vehicle liability insurance policy would have included the driver as
an "insured" under its omnibus provision.3 ' However, in other
situations where a principal's insurance policy covers only his ac-
tions and those of his agents if he is legally liable,31 an injured
plaintiff would be relegated to seeking relief from a possibly un-
insured agent if his principal obtained a nonsuit under the Branch
rule. Thus, to provide adequate redress for a plaintiff injured by
an agent in the scope of his employment, the court should reconsider
its approach.
It appears that the North Carolina Supreme Court could have
either admitted an agent's admission against his principal or applied
the doctrine of respondeat superior without regard to the dilemma
appearing in successive actions. Should the court continue its harsh
approach, it is hoped that the legislature will provide appropriate
relief by making an agent's statement to an investigating officer
admissible against his principal.
COMANN P. CRAVER, JR.
"The National Standard Policy contains the following provision:
Definition of Insured. With respect to the insurance for bodily injury
liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word 'in-
sured' includes the named insured and also includes any person while
using the [motor vehicle] . . . provided the actual use of the [motor
vehicle] is by the named insured or with his permission....
GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 559 (1959). In
North Carolina, all motor vehicle owners must carry minimum liability
insurance coverage. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (Supp. 1965). Even though
there is no requirement that such policies contain an omnibus provision,
most policies provide this encompassing provision.
" This is a general liability insurance policy carried by employers that
covers almost all types of liabilities except those arising from motor vehicle
operation. For a discussion of the various types of policies, see RIEGEL &
MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 669-726 (1959).
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